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DISCRIMINATION-AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT-UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA HOLDS THAT AN
INTERNET WEBSITE IS NOT A PLACE
OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION:
ACCESS NOW, INC. V. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, CO.
KAA GRIMES*
IN ORDER TO eliminate discrimination and provide equal op-
portunities for individuals with disabilities, Congress enacted
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990.1 Title III of
the ADA prohibits discrimination in "place [s] of public accom-
modation."2 Since Congress enacted the ADA, the world has
seen major advances in technology and a dramatic increase in
the use of the Internet.' Recently, in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest
Airlines, Co.,4 the District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida had the opportunity to apply the ADA in this new market-
place. However, the court dismissed the case, finding that an
airline website is not a place of public accommodation since it is
not "a physical, concrete structure."5 By narrowly construing
this term, the court disregarded Congress' stated purpose in en-
acting the ADA6 and failed to apply the Act in a modern society.
Further, the court's second finding, that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a nexus between the website and "a physical, concrete
place of public accommodation,"7 lacks merit because the court
* B.B.A., Baylor University; M.B.A., University of Texas at Dallas. J.D.
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Dwain and Judy Heath, and my husband, Chris Grimes, for their love and
support. Thank you for encouraging me and enabling me to pursue my dreams.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
2 Id. § 12182(a).
3 Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S.D.
Fla. 2002).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1318-19.
6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
7 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
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fails to adequately distinguish Eleventh Circuit precedent on
this issue. Consequently, individuals with disabilities, namely
blind individuals, are unable to pursue the same opportunities
on the Internet afforded to individuals who have their sight.
Southwest Airlines operates a website which provides custom-
ers with the means to purchase airline tickets, check fares and
schedules, and stay up-to-date on sales and promotions.' A sig-
nificant portion of the airline's business is derived from the In-
ternet.9 Although assistive technologies are available, which
convert text and graphics to audio signals, Southwest's website
does not provide the "alternative text" needed to utilize these
systems."0 Thus, while it is "technically possible" for a blind per-
son to purchase tickets via the website, the plaintiffs in this case
assert that it is "extremely difficult.""
Access Now, "a non-profit, access advocacy organization for
disabled individuals," and Robert Gumson, a blind individual,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.1 2
The plaintiffs alleged that Southwest operated its website in vio-
lation of the ADA, since the goods and services offered at the
"virtual ticket counters" are inaccessible to blind persons. 13 In
response, the court granted Southwest's motion to dismiss the
complaint.14
Judge Seitz addressed the issue of whether an Internet website
is a place of public accommodation under the ADA.' 5 The
court noted that the statute identifies twelve categories of public
accommodation. 16 In addition, the court cited Rendon v. Val-
leycrest Productions, Ltd. for the proposition that "the Eleventh
Circuit has recognized Congress' clear intent that Title III of the
ADA governs solely access to physical, concrete places of public
accommodation."'17 While finding that the plain and unambigu-
8 Id. at 1315.
9 Id. (reporting "that approximately 46 percent, or over $500 million, of its
passenger revenue for first quarter 2002 was generated by online bookings via
southwest.com").
10 Id. at 1314-16.
11 Id. at 1316 n.3.
12 Id. at 1314.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1316.
15 Id. at 1317.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1318 (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-84
(11th Cir. 2002)).
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ous language of the statute does not include websites, the court
nevertheless addressed the plaintiffs allegation that the website
falls within the scope of Title III as "a place of exhibition, display
and a sales establishment.""8 In rejecting this assertion, the
court explained that those terms must be viewed in the specific
context in which they were placed and, under the rule of ejus-
dem generis, general words that follow specific enumerations
"should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifi-
cally enumerated." 19 The court stated that the general terms re-
lied upon by the plaintiffs corresponded to specifically
enumerated physical, concrete structures that restrict the mean-
ing of the general terms so as to exclude websites from their
scope. 20 Accordingly, the court concluded that Southwest's In-
ternet website was not a place of public accommodation.21
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the
plaintiff established a sufficient nexus between the website and a
physical, concrete place of public accommodation.22 Although
the plaintiffs argued that the First Circuit, in Carparts Distribution
Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England,
Inc., held that a public accommodation is not limited to actual
physical structures, the court dismissed the relevant language as
dicta and noted that the Eleventh Circuit "has not read [the stat-
ute] nearly as broadly. '2' The court also dismissed as dicta lan-
guage in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., a Seventh Circuit
case which recognized a website as a facility within the core
meaning of the statute. 24 Further, the court found the holding
in Martin v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, which
stated that a website violated the ADA because it could not be
read by sight-impaired persons using screen readers, unconvinc-
ing since the case was brought under Title II of the Act instead
of Title 111.25 Lastly, the court distinguished Rendon, which
found a sufficient "nexus between the challenged service and
18 Id.
19 Id. (citing Allen v. A.G. Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1981))).
20 Id. at 1319.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. (analyzing Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of
New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)).
24 Id. at 1319 n.9 (refusing to follow Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d
557 (7th Cir. 1999)).
25 Id. at 1319 (rejecting Martin v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F.
Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2002)).
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the premises of the public accommodation," by comparing the
geographic nature of a television studio with the lack of any spe-
cific geographic location associated with a website.2 6 Thus, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs were unable to show that
Southwest's website impeded "their access to a specific, physical,
concrete space such as a particular airline ticket counter or
travel agency. 27
Although the court correctly articulated that the initial step in
statutory construction is to look at the statute's plain and unam-
biguous meaning,28 the court incorrectly narrowed the meaning
of the provision under consideration. The court interpreted the
statute as having an implicit requirement that a public accom-
modation be a "physical, concrete structure," since many of the
entities listed in the statute may be categorized this way.2 9 First,
as recognized by the court, the statute does not explicitly impose
this requirement.3 0 Instead, a public accommodation is defined
as a private entity whose operations affect commerce and whose
enterprise falls into one of the twelve enumerated categories. 1
These categories include sales establishments: "a bakery, grocery
store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;" and service establishments: "a
laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, . . .travel service .... or other
service establishment. 32 Not only is the listing of a travel service
directly on point, it also illustrates one example of the court's
flawed interpolation that an entity must be a concrete, physical
structure since many travel services operate exclusively on the
Internet.3 Further, even if Southwest's website is not consid-
ered a travel service, it fits within the plain meaning of a sales
and/or service establishment and meets the statute's other re-
quirements that it be a private entity whose operations affect
commerce. Lastly, the court fails to recognize the historical con-
text in which the statute was enacted. Although the Internet was
26 Id. at 1320-21 (quoting Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 n.8).
27 Id. at 1321.
28 Id. at 1317 (citing Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283 n.6 (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))).
29 See id. at 1317-19.
30 Id. at 1317 (stating that the issue of whether an Internet website is a place of
public accommodation "presents a question of statutory construction").
31 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
32 Id. § 12181(7) (E)-(F).
33 See generally Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (noting that "[m]any travel services con-
duct business by telephone or correspondence without requiring their customers
to enter an office in order to obtain their services").
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present in 1990, it was not widely used as a means of conducting
business and providing services as it is today. By ending all
twelve of the enumerated categories with "or other" followed by
a general term,34 Congress declined to make the list exclusive
and specifically allowed for a broader application of the statute
to entities and industries related to those specifically enumer-
ated. Reading the open-ended language with the purpose of the
statute-to prohibit discrimination and provide equal opportu-
nities for the disabled-Southwest's website falls within the
scope of the ADA and the court erred in excluding it.
The court also erred in citing Rendon as authority for limiting
the definition of a public accommodation to a physical, con-
crete place. Although this terminology is not used in the case to
define public accommodation, 5 the court mistakenly reads it as
implicit in the holding. Rendon, however, addressed the issue of
whether Title III encompassed a claim involving hearing-im-
paired individuals screened from participation in a television
quiz show through the use of a fast finger telephone selection
process. 6 Since the defendants in Rendon conceded that the
show took place at a public accommodation,37 the court did not
address the scope of the term. Thus, the court in Access Now
lacks either statutory authority or case precedent for its narrow
definition of public accommodation.
Regarding the second issue in Access Now, whether the plain-
tiff established a sufficient nexus between the website and a
physical, concrete place of public accommodation, the court
failed to follow precedent. The Rendon decision is on point,
finding that "Title III covers both tangible barriers ... and in-
tangible barriers . . . that restrict a disabled person's ability to
enjoy the defendant entity's goods, services, and privileges. 38
In fact, as the court noted, an entity's refusal "to provide a rea-
sonable auxiliary service that would permit the disabled to gain
access to or use its goods and services," may create an intangible
barrier.3' Further, the court in Rendon stated that discrimina-
tion, through the imposition of screening requirements, does
not have to "occur on site to offend the ADA."4 In an attempt
34 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7).
35 See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1279-86.
36 Id. at 1280.
37 Id. at 1283.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1284 n.7.
40 Id. at 1283-84.
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to distinguish Rendon, the court in Access Now focused on the
different geographic character of television studios and web-
sites.4" Not only does this distinction contradict the general pre-
mise in Rendon, the elimination of barriers for the disabled, but
it ignores the fact that the website is a portal to Southwest's
ticket counters-concrete, physical places which squarely fall
within the court's narrow characterization of a public accommo-
dation. Just as the fast finger telephone selection process served
as a "discriminatory screening mechanism ' 42 for accessing a tele-
vision studio, Southwest's website served as a screening mecha-
nism for accessing its ticket counters. In both cases, intangible
barriers impeded access to physical, concrete facilities. Accord-
ingly, following precedent from Rendon, the court in Access Now
should have found a sufficient nexus between Southwest's web-
site and a place of public accommodation.
Further support for application of the ADA to websites may be
found in other federal circuit and district court cases. Although
the court in Access Now dismissed the language as dicta, Doe spe-
cifically states:
The core meaning of [the] provision, plainly enough, is that the
owner or operator of a store, hotel, . . . travel agency, theater,
Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in elec-
tronic space ... ) that is open to the public cannot exclude dis-
abled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using
the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.4 3
Even more on point, the Martin court specifically found an
ADA violation where a website for the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority was not formatted to allow sight-im-
paired persons using screen readers to obtain information and
schedule service.44 Although the core facts in Martin were al-
most indistinguishable from those in Access Now, the court relied
on the distinction between a Title II claim and a Title III
claim.45 This distinction is unconvincing. Although Title II ap-
plies to public entities, whereas Title III applies to private enti-
ties, 46 both provisions are part of the same Act and, where
possible, should be construed consistently. Further, whether
the claim is under Title II or Title III, both provisions have a
41 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
42 Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1286.
43 Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
- Martin, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.
45 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 n.9.
46 Id.
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common purpose, which is to eliminate discrimination toward
disabled individuals. Therefore, although the court in Access
Now failed to give weight to the decisions, these cases demon-
strate the recognition in other circuits of the ADA's application
in modern society.
While applying the ADA in this context may initially prove
costly for entities, this should not serve as a barrier. As the mar-
ketplace continues to move toward globalization and height-
ened competition, businesses will look increasingly toward low
cost methods, such as the Internet, for marketing and selling
their goods and services. Accordingly, consumers will become
increasingly dependent on the Internet as the source for those
goods and services as businesses scale down other outlets, such
as physical, concrete store locations. As more entities conduct
business exclusively over the Internet, it is easy to foresee that
disabled individuals will, in effect, be squeezed out of the mar-
ket and left unable to pursue the same opportunities as nondis-
abled individuals. Given Congress' finding at the time the ADA
was enacted, that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increas-
ing as the population as a whole is growing older, '47 the magni-
tude of this effect in the future is distressing.
Even in today's marketplace, the result in Access Now is unten-
able given the stated purpose of the ADA, the plain language of
the statute, and judicial precedent. As stated by the court in
Carparts, "[i] t would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA,
but persons who purchase the same services over the telephone
or by mail are not[;] Congress could not have intended such an
absurd result. '48 The court in Access Now failed to see the forest
through the trees and, thus, constructed a roadblock for blind
individuals attempting to access the same opportunities over the
Internet as sighted persons.
47 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1).
48 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
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